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1. Public Contracts. 






14-1-2 to 14-1-4. Repealed. 
14-1-5 to 14-1-12. Repealed. 
14-1-13. Performance and payment bonds on 
public projects - Conditions 
and terms. 
14-1-1. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 14-1-1 (L. 1909, ch. 68, 
§ 1; 1917, ch. 36, § 2; C.L. 1917, § 3753; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, § 17-1-1), providing for bond 
14-1-1.1. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 14-1-1.1 (L. 1953, ch. 23, 
§ 1), relating to security in connection with 
bids, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 75, § 5. 
14-1-2 to 14-1-4. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Sections 14-1-2 to 14-1-4 (L. 
1909, ch. 68, §§ 1, 2; 1917, ch. 36, § 2; C.L. 
1917, §§ 3753 to 3755; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
17-1-2 to 17-1-4; L. 1961, ch. 27, § 1), relating 
14-1-5 to 14-1-12. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Sections 14-1-5 to 14-1-12 (L. 
1963, ch. 15, §§ 1 to 5; 1969, ch. 36, §§ 1 to 3), 
relating to bonding of contractors for public 
Section 
14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds. 
14-1-15. Liability of state or political subdivi-
sion failing to obtain bond. 
14-1-16. Attorney's fees. 
14-1-17. Exemption of entities subject to Pro-
curement Code. 
to protect mechanics and materialmen, was re-
pealed by Laws 1963, ch. 15, § 6. 
For present comparable provisions, see 
§ 63-56-1 et seq. 
to recovery on bonds to protect mechanics and 
materialmen, were repealed by Laws 1963, ch. 
15, § 6. 
buildings and public works, were repealed by 
Laws 1980, ch. 75, § 5. For present comparable 
provisions, see § 63-56-1 et seq. 
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14-1-13. Performance and payment bonds on public 
projects - Conditions and terms. 
(1) Before any contract for the construction, alteration or repair of any 
public building, public work or public improvement of the state or its political 
subdivisions is awarded to any person, that person shall furnish to the appro-
priate political entity the following bonds: 
(a) a performance bond in and amount equal to 100% of the price speci-
fied in the contract upon the faithful performance of the contract, solely 
for the protection of the political entity awarding the contract; and 
(b) a payment bond in an amount equal to 100% of the price specified in 
the contract, solely for the protection of persons supplying labor or mate-
rials to the contractor or his subcontractors for the performance of work 
provided for in the contract. 
(2) Each bond shall be: 
(a) binding upon the award of the contract to the person; 
(b) executed by a surety company or companies duly authorized to do 
business in this state; 
(c) payable to the appropriate political entity; and 
(d) filed in the office of the political entity awarding the contract. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the 
state or its political subdivisions to require additional performance bonds or 
other security. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Liability for failure to exact bond. 
Necessity for furnishing bond. 
Purpose and construction. 
Liability for failure to exact bond. 
Failure of a school district to require bond 
from contractor did not render it liable to con-
tractor's assignee whose right to money was 
subordinate to claims for labor and materials. 
South High School Dist. v. McMillan Paper & 
Supply Co., 49 Utah 477, 164 P. 1041 (1917); 
Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 49 Utah 
493, 164 P. 1047 (1917), applying Laws 1909, 
ch. 68. 
This section merely required contractor to 
execute the bond mentioned therein, but did 
not impose the duty upon any particular per-
son to exact such a bond. New York Blower Co. 
v. Carbon County High School, 50 Utah 342, 
167 P. 670 (1917). 
School district was not liable to parties sup-
plying labor and material to construct high 
school building for failure to require the bond 
mentioned herein. New York Blower Co. v. 
Carbon County High School, 50 Utah 342, 167 
P. 670 (1917). 
School trustees were not personally liable for 
failure to require the bond mentioned herein. 
New York Blower Co. v. Carbon County High 
School, 50 Utah 342, 167 P. 670 (1917). 
Necessity for furnishing bond. 
Under statute anyone interested could de-
mand that a bond be executed or required, and 
thereafter a refusal to do so would be willful. 
Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 49 Utah 
493, 164 P. 1047 (1917). 
Purpose and construction. 
Statute was highly remedial for the benefit 
of and to provide security for all persons fur-
nishing labor and materials on public work. 
Campbell Bldg. Co. v. District Court of Millard 
County, 90 Utah 552, 63 P.2d 255 (1936). 
Statute was not for the benefit of the con-
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tractor but for the benefit of the state, the cred- Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341 
itors and the surety. State ex rel. McBride v. (1938). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative 
Survey - 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 127. 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors' 
Bonds § 43 et seq.; 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public 
Works and Contracts § 99. 
C.J.S. - SIA C.J.S. States § 119. 
A.L.R. - Duty of public authority to dis-
close to contractor information, allegedly in its 
possession, affecting cost or feasibility of 
project, 86 A.L.R.3d 182. 
Key Numbers. - States ,s,,, 101. 
14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds. 
(1) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or 
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract for which a payment bond 
is furnished under this chapter, and has not been paid in full within 90 days 
from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was 
supplied, shall have the right to sue on the payment bond for any amount 
unpaid at the time the suit is filed and to sue on the contract for the amount 
due. 
(2) Any person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but 
no express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the payment 
bond, shall have a right of action upon the payment bond upon giving written 
notice to the contractor within 90 days from the date on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material was supplied. The person shall state in the 
notice the amount claimed and the name of the party for whom the labor was 
performed or to whom the material was supplied. The notice shall be served 
personally or by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope 
addressed to the contractor at any place the contractor maintains an office or 
conducts business. 
(3) Any person may obtain from the appropriate political entity a certified 
copy of a bond upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and 
postage. A certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the con-
tents, execution, and delivery of the original. 
(4) Any action instituted on the payment bond shall be brought in the 
appropriate court in the political subdivision in which the contract was to be 
performed. The action shall be commenced within one one year after the 
furnishing of materials or labor, except if the claimant is a subcontractor of 
the contractor, the action shall be commenced within one year from the date 
on which final payment under the subcontract became due. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Abandonment of contract. 
Claims of creditors against contractor. 
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Last day material furnished. 
Lien of laborers or materialmen. 
Purpose and construction of act. 
Timeliness of notice. 
Abandonment of contract. 
A contract could not be regarded as aban-
doned if its terms and conditions were per-
formed by surety company instead of by the 
contractor. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914). 
Claims of creditors against contractor. 
The statute dealt only with actions against 
the surety; claims of creditors against the con-
tractor were not affected thereby and could be 
asserted at any time within the general statute 
of limitations. State ex rel. McBride v. Camp-
bell Bldg. Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341 (1938). 
Last day material furnished. 
Date on which the last of material was fur-
nished was the delivery date for purposes of 
this section and it was not extended by subse-
quent substitution of new and different con-
trols to correct the supplier's error. A.A. 
Maycock, Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 24 
Utah 2d 369, 472 P.2d 424 (1970). 
Liens of laborers or materialmen. 
Although a workman or materialman could 
not acquire a lien on a public building for labor 
or material furnished in the construction of 
such building in view of § 38-1-1, he might 
have a preferential right to money in the 
hands of the public corporation to be used in 
the construction of the building under this sec-
tion. Mountain States Supply Co. v. Nuttall-
Allen Co., 63 Utah 384, 225 P. 811 (1924). 
Purpose and construction of act. 
Former law, insofar as it allowed "any per-
son" supplying labor or materials to sue, was 
highly remedial, and was, in furtherance of 
justice, to receive a liberal construction and ap-
plication so as to accomplish its real object and 
purpose. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914), applying Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 1400x, now repealed. 
The purpose of the former statute was to en-
able creditors of or claimants against contrac-
tor on public buildings to collect for work and 
materials furnished by them ratably and equi-
tably from contractor and his bondsmen in all 
cases to the full amount and extent of the 
surety bond. Board of Educ. v. West, 55 Utah 
357, 186 P. 114 (1919). 
Timeliness of notice. 
Materialman having delivered goods to sub-
contractor of state-owned bridge project could 
not hold the prime contractor or surety liable 
for payment where he had no contractual rela-
tionship with the prime contractor and did not 
give ninety-day notice to the contractor; under 
the prior law, plaintiff had no action against 
the prime contractor or surety because the ac-
tion was not commenced within one year of the 
date of final settlement of the bridge contract 
by the state. American Oil Co. v. General Con-
tracting Corp., 17 Utah 2d 330, 411 P.2d 486 
(1966). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors' 
Bonds § 114 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 81A C.J.S. States § 125. 
Key Numbers. - States eao 101. 
14-1-15. Liability of state or political subdivision failing to 
obtain bond. 
If the state or one of its political subdivisions fails to obtain a payment bond, 
it shall, upon demand by a person who has supplied materials or performed 
labor under the applicable contract, promptly make payment to that person, 
and the creditor shall have a direct right of action on his account against the 
appropriate political entity in any court having jurisdiction in the county in 
which the contract was to be performed. The action shall be commenced 
within one year after the furnishing of materials or labor. 
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History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 3. 
14-1-16. Attorney's fees. 
The prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, § 4. 
14-1-17. Exemption of entities subject to Procurement 
Code. 
This chapter shall apply only to those political entities not subject to the 
provisions of Chapter 56, Title 63. 




14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and mate-
rialmen. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct lia-
bility - Limitation of actions. 
Section 
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics 
and materialmen - Attorney's 
fee. 
14-2-4. Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficiar-
ies, trustees. 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 
or more, for the construction, addition to, alteration, or repair of any building, 
structure, or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is com-
menced, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract 
price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful perfor-
mance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished, equipment 
and materials rented, and labor performed under the contract. This bond runs 
to the owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear. Any person 
who has furnished or rented any equipment or materials, or performed labor 
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for which payment 
has not been made, has a direct right of action against the sureties upon such 
bond for the reasonable value of the rented materials or equipment furnished, 
for the reasonable value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed, not 
exceeding the prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 days after 
the completion, abandonment, or default in the performance of the work pro-
vided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon request. 
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 1 to ·3; C.L. 
1917, §§ 3759 to 3761; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
17-2-1; L. 1977, ch. 56, § 3; 1985, ch. 219, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend-
ment inserted "equipment and materials 
rented," after "material furnished" near the 
end of the first sentence of the first paragraph 




the second, third and fourth sentences; substi-
tuted "This bond runs" at the beginning of the 
second sentence for "Such bond shall run"; de-
leted "and" after "may appear" to form the 
third sentence; inserted "or rented any equip-
ment or" before "materials" in the third sen-
tence; substituted "for which payment" in the 
third sentence for "payment for which"; substi-
tuted "has" for "shall have"; inserted "for the 
reasonable value of the rented materials or 
equipment furnished" in the third sentence af-
ter "upon such bond"; substituted "for labor 
performed, not exceeding the prices agreed 
upon" at the end of the third sentence for 
"labor performed, not exceeding, however, in 
any case the prices agreed upon; which"; sub-
stituted "This right of action accrues 40 days" 
in the fourth sentence for "right of action shall 
accrue for 40 days"; substituted "This bond" in 
the last paragraph for "The bond herein pro-
vided for"; and made minor changes in phrase-
ology and punctuation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Acceptance of notes from contractor. 
Construction and application. 
Contract vendee. 
Duty to furnish bond. 
Failure of builder to require bond. 
Lessee of land. 
Leveling of land. 
Material becoming a part of realty. 
Materialmen supplying subcontractor. 
Mechanic's lien law. 
One-year statute of limitations. 
Performance bond. 
Proof of status as materialman. 
Purpose of chapter. 
Sufficiency of bond. 
Terms of bond. 
Unlicensed subcontractor. 
Constitutionality. 
This section is constitutional; it does not in-
fringe the due process clause of the Constitu-
tion. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 
Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 1918A L.R.A. 1193 
(1917). 
Acceptance of notes from contractor. 
Materialman who accepted contractor's 
notes for balance due on materials furnished 
was estopped from bringing an action against 
owners of the construction projects in question, 
who had failed to furnish the bonds required by 
this section, for the balance that remained due 
after the contractor declared bankruptcy. Apex 
Lumber Co. v. Comanche Constr. Co., 18 Utah 
2d 119, 417 P.2d 131 (1966). 
Construction and application. 
This chapter protects the laborer and materi-
alman as well as the landowner; it makes no 
distinction between resident and nonresident. 
King Bros. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 
339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962). 
Contract vendee. 
Buyer of home under construction who exe-
cuted agreement to purchase home from owner 
thereof who was also general contractor for 
construction of home was not "owner of any 
interest in land" within meaning of statute and 
hence was not liable to unpaid materialman; 
buyer was, however, liable to unpaid material-
man for fixtures added to home which were not 
provided for in plans and specifications for the 
home and which buyer had specifically re-
quested materialman to install. Harries v. 
Valgardson, 19 Utah 2d 433, 432 P.2d 58 
(1967). 
Duty to furnish bond. 
Under this section a bond may be demanded 
from the contractor to the lessee to protect les-
see and lessor against mechanics' liens. 
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., 88 Utah 
213, 53 P.2d 1153 (1936). 
Failure of builder to require bond. 
Where owner-builder failed to require home 
contractor to file the bond required by this sec-
tion, such owner-builder was liable for wages 
due the contractor's employees, even though 
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such employees had signed releases and lien 
waivers for everything to owner-builder when 
he paid the employees for only part of their 
labor. Pierce v. Pepper, 17 Utah 2d 123, 405 
P.2d 345 (1965). 
Lessee of land. 
Party who entered into contract for construc-
tion of lumber curing plant was owner of "in-
terest in land" within meaning of statute, and, 
having failed to obtain performance bond as 
required by the statute, was liable to material-
man upon default of general contractor not-
withstanding fact that he was lessee rather 
than owner of land. King Bros. v. Utah Dry 
Kiln Co., 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968). 
Leveling of land. 
Work in leveling is not an improvement 
upon land requiring the owner to obtain a bond 
from the contractor. Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 
2d 364, 294 P.2d 703 (1956). 
Material becoming a part of realty. 
In order to qualify under this chapter it is 
necessary that there be an annexation to the 
land, or to some permanent structure upon it, 
so that the materials in question can properly 
be regarded as having become a part of the 
realty, or a fixture appurtenant to it; and this 
must be done with the intention of making it a 
permanent part thereof. That the addition is 
consistent with the use to which the property is 
put is often helpful in making the determina-
tion. King Bros. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 
2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962). 
An action by a materialman against a land-
owner for reasonable value of materials sup-
plied to a contractor building a dry kiln plant 
for defendant, based on defendant's failure to 
require contractor to furnish performance 
bond, should not have been dismissed without 
the taking of evidence to determine whether 
such things as a furnace, furnace casing, mo-
torized fans, pipes, and hoods, which often be-
come permanent adjuncts to a building were or 
were not so used as to come within the mean-
ing of this section and § 14-2-2. King Bros. v. 
Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 
254 (1962). 
Aluminum railings and gates installed in a 
bank were an "addition to, or alteration or 
repair of, any building, structure or improve-
ment upon land" affording protection to third-
party supplier thereof against failure of the 
bank to procure a bond from its installing con-
tractor under this section and§ 14-2-2. Metals 
Mfg. Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 
395 P.2d 914 (1964). 
Materialmen supplying subcontractor. 
Action by materialmen against homeowner 
for material supplied subcontractor of bank-
rupt general contractor was not within pur-
view of the statute where the materialmen 
supplied the subcontractor so that the home-
owner was not in privity with the material-
men, the homeowner owed nothing to the gen-
eral contractor and the materialmen extended 
credit to the subcontractor. Crown Roofing & 
Eng'r Co. v. Robinson, 19 Utah 2d 417, 432 
P.2d 47 (1967). 
Mechanics' lien law. 
Statute is auxiliary to mechanics' lien law 
and is just as much in aid of it as if it had been 
made a part of it. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. 
Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 1918A L.R.A. 
1193 (1917). 
Because of the common purpose of the me-
chanics' lien statutes (§§ 38-1-1 to 38-1-26) 
and contractor's bond statutes (this section and 
§ 14-2-2) and their practically identical lan-
guage, adjudications as to what is lienable un-
der the former are helpful in determining the 
proper application of the latter. King Bros. v. 
Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 
254 (1962). 
One-year statute of limitations. 
Cause of action which arose while three-year 
statute of limitation was in effect became sub-
ject to one-year statute of limitation under 
statute as amended as of effective date of the 
one-year statute, so that a cause of action aris-
ing five and a half months before the effective 
date of the one-year statute lapsed seventeen 
and a half months later. Day & Night Heating 
Co. v. Ruff, 19 Utah 2d 412, 432 P.2d 43 (1967). 
Performance bond. 
This section does not require the execution of 
a performance bond to assure the owners they 
will get what they bargained for in their con-
tract with the general contractor. Lignell v. 
Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979). 
Proof of status as materialman. 
Invoice between plaintiff and installer, recit-
ing that merchandise was purchased for resale, 
was not conclusive evidence that plaintiff was 
a materialman entitled to the benefits of this 
statute. Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 
Utah 2d 413, 335 P.2d 837 (1959). 
Purpose of chapter. 
Purpose of this statute is to prevent land-
owners from having their lands improved by 
third persons, without becoming personally re-
sponsible for reasonable value of materials and 
labor. Liberty Coal & Lumber Co. v. Snow, 53 
Utah 298, 178 P. 341 (1919). 
Sufficiency of bond. 
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon con-
tractor's faithful performance of contract and 
containing no express provision for payment of 
materialmen, was sufficient under this section 
to exonerate an owner from liability, and to 
sustain the right of the materialmen to sue the 
surety, in view of the fact that the contract 
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expressly required the contractor to pay for all 
labor and materials. De Luxe Glass Co. v. Mar-
tin, 116 Utah 144, 208 P.2d 1127 (1949), distin-
guished, 3 Utah 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448 (1955). 
Where owners of tract of land upon which a 
franchised restaurant was built accepted per-
formance bond from the contractor, the obliga-
tion of which ran only to them and not to "all 
other persons as their interest may appear," 
they were liable for payment of judgment for 
materials delivered, even though the contrac-
tor had been hired by the restaurant chain and 
owners had no privity of contract with him, 
since they had dealt directly with the contrac-
tor and had supervised payment of subcontrac-
tors. Bennett v. Downard, 533 P.2d 1348 (Utah 
1975). 
Terms of bond. 
Where the condition of the bond is that the 
surety will indemnify the owner if the contrac-
tor fails to pay for material and labor, it is not 
such a bond contemplated by this section so as 
to allow a direct action by the materialman 
against the surety, as it does not promise that 
the contractor will pay for the material and 
labor. Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Phoenix 
Indem. Co., 3 Utah 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448 
(1955). 
Unlicensed subcontractor. 
The fact that a subcontractor is unlicensed 
will not bar his right to sue on a bond or di-
rectly against the owner who fails to require a 
bond. Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299 
P.2d 837 (1956). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors' 
Bonds § 1 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256. 
A.L.R. - Effect on compensation of archi-
tect or building contractor of express provision 
in private building contract limiting the cost of 
the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778. 
Key Numbers. - Mechanics' Liens <t=> 313. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct liability - Limi-
tation of actions. 
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain 
such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall 
be personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed 
labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished 
or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed 
upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be commenced within one year 
from the last date the last materials were furnished or the labor performed. 
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 4, 5; C.L. 1917, 
§§ 3762, 3763; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 17-2-2; L. 
1965, ch. 24, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Application of statute of limitations. 
Construction of terms of bond. 
Duty to exact bond .. 
Failure of builder to require bond. 
Installment payments by debtor-contractor. 
Mortgagee's liability for prepayment of general contractor. 
Prejudgment interest. 
Substantial performance. 
Sufficiency of bond. 
Supplier as materialman. 
Unlicensed subcontractor. 
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Constitutionality. 
This section is constitutional; it does not vio-
late due process. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. 
Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 1918A L.R.A. 
1193 (1917). 
Application of statute of limitations. 
Since § 14-2-1 imposes a duty upon the 
owner of property to require a contractor's 
bond, the statute of limitations applies only to 
suits involving such bonds, obtained by con-
tractor at the behest of the owner; thus where a 
general contractor required a subcontractor to 
furnish a bond to protect himself and material-
men, the applicable statute of limitations in a 
suit by an unpaid materialman was 
§ 78-12-23, and this section did not apply. Ar-
nold Mach. Co. v. Prince, 550 P.2d 193 (Utah 
1976). 
Construction of terms of bond. 
Terms of a bond which attempted to restrict 
period for commencement of an action on the 
bond to ninety days was regarded as surplus-
age and the one-year period in this section was 
applicable. Oscar E. Chytraus Co. v. Wasatch 
Furnace & Elec., Inc., 28 Utah 2d 339, 502 P.2d 
554 (1972). 
Duty to exact bond. 
Where agreement between a son who owned 
real property and his father required the latter 
to construct a dwelling upon the land of the 
son, and provided that the father would pay 
the cost of constructing the house, the son had 
a duty to require the father to execute the bond 
but, in absence of securing such bond, he was 
liable for value of materials. Liberty Coal & 
Lumber Co. v. Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 P. 341 
(1919). 
Failure of builder to require bond. 
Property owner who failed to obtain bond 
was liable to a materialman for materials fur-
nished to a contractor erecting block walls for 
the property owner, even though the owner, at 
the time of payment for materials used by him-
self when he completed construction of the 
building, received a release of all claims from 
the materialman. Roberts Inv. Co. v. Gibbons 
& Reed Concrete Prods. Co., 22 Utah 2d 105, 
449 P.2d 116 (1969). 
Failure by and owner to procure required 
bond from a general contractor does not result 
in absolute liability upon the contractor's de-
fault; where the owner had paid the general 
contractor all sums owing in reliance on lien 
waivers signed by the subcontractor acknowl-
edging receipt of payment not in fact received, 
there was an issue of material fact as to the 
rights of the parties when the subcontractor 
sought payment from the owner upon the gen-
eral contractor's insolvency. J.P. Koch, Inc. v. 
J.C. Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975). 
Installment payments by debtor-contrac-
tor. 
The lower court erred in granting summary 
judgment to a materialman where it appeared 
from the pleadings that the contractor owed 
the materialman a large sum for several con-
tracting jobs and was paying off the material-
man by furnishing him sand and where it was 
not clear whether the credit given the contrac-
tor's account for such sand deliveries had ap-
plied to the materials used in the project. 
Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Paulos Auto Co., 17 
Utah 2d 402, 413 P.2d 596 (1966). 
Mortgagee's liability for prepayment of 
general contractor. 
Where general contractor, employed to con-
struct a house was not required to produce a 
surety bond and the owner's mortgagee paid 
such general contractor his full compensation 
knowing that the general contractor had not 
paid materialmen and laborers, the owner of 
the project was liable to materialmen and la-
borers not paid by the general contractor and 
the mortgagee, joined by the owner as a third-
party defendant, was liable to the owner for an 
identical amount. Home Elec. Corp. v. Russell, 
17 Utah 2d 276, 409 P.2d 388 (1965). 
Prejudgment interest. 
Where a contractor defaulted on payment to 
a materialman, and the materialman obtained 
judgment against the owner because of the 
owner's failure to furnish a bond to protect the 
materialman, the materialman was entitled to 
prejudgment interest from the date of first no-
tice to the owner for demand of payment, and 
not from the due date indicated on the invoice, 
where at time the debt was due, credit was 
being extended to the contractor by the materi-
alman for already past-due debts. Triple I Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 
(Utah 1982). 
Substantial performance. 
Doctrine of substantial performance is appli-
cable to this bonding statute; where a heating 
subcontract was substantially completed on 
December 23, 1968, the fact that one minor 
item, a register representing .0011385 percent 
of the value of the subcontract, was not fur-
nished until February 19, 1969 does not extend 
the limitation period for filing action on bond. 
Carlisle v. Cox, 29 Utah 2d 136, 506 P.2d 60 
(1973). 
Sufficiency of bond. 
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon con-
tractor's faithful performance of contract, and 
containing no express provision for payment of 
materialmen, was sufficient under this section 
to exonerate an owner from liability, and to 
sustain right ofmaterialmen to sue the surety, 
in view of the fact that the contract expressly 
required the contractor to pay for all labor and 
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materials. De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 
Utah 144, 208 P.2d 1127 (1949), distinguished, 
Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Phoenix Indem. 
Co., 3 Utah 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448 (1955). 
Supplier as materialman. 
Supplier was a materialman entitled to re-
covery under this section in view of evidence 
establishing that materials were delivered to a 
plumbing subcontractor for a specific job 
rather than on open account and that the sup-
plier's records enabled it to identify the con-
tract job to which it delivered the materials 
and separate those materials from the subcon-
tractor's other purchases. Lawson Supply Co. 
v. General Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 27 Utah 
2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972). 
Unlicensed subcontractor. 
Fact that a subcontractor is unlicensed will 
not bar his right to sue on a bond or directly 
against the owner who fails to require a bond. 
Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299 P.2d 837 
(1937). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors' 
Bonds § 1 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256. 
Key Numbers. - Mechanics' Liens e,, 313. 
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics and material-
men - Attorney's fee. 
In any action brought upon the bond provided for under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
History: C. 1953, 14-2-3, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 16, § [1]. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action on contract. 
Performance bond. 
Recovery of attorney fee. 
Action on contract. 
This section provides no authority to award 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in an ac-
tion on the construction contract between the 
owners and the general contractor. Lignell v. 
Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979). 
Performance bond. 
This section provides no authority to award 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in an ac-
tion between owners and surety on a perfor-
mance bond not required by this chapter. 
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979). 
Recovery of attorney fee. 
Materialman, entitled to recover the value of 
materials furnished contractor in a suit 
against the owner of the property for the 
owner's failure to obtain a bond, was not enti-
tled to recover attorney's fees in the action be-
cause the statute did not provide for an attor-
ney's fee in the event that a bond was not sup-
plied. Roberts Inv. Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Con-
crete Prods. Co., 22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P.2d 116 
(1969). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. -17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors' 
Bonds § 135. 
A.L.R. - Construction of attorney's fees 
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14-2-4. Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficiaries, trustees. 
Nothing in this chapter requires a mortgagee under a mortgage or a benefi-
ciary or trustee under a deed of trust to obtain the bond described in§ 14-2-1, 
or imposes any liability upon a mortgagee, beneficiary, or trustee who has not 
obtained such a bond. 
History: C. 1953, 14-2-4, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 207, § 1. 
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